International Lawyer
Volume 15

Number 1

Article 2

1981

The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code: A Step in the
North-South Dialogue
Timothy B. Atkeson
David G. Gill

Recommended Citation
Timothy B. Atkeson & David G. Gill, The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code: A Step in the NorthSouth Dialogue, 15 INT'L L. 1 (1981)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol15/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please
visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

TIMOTHY B. ATKESON*
DAVID G. GILL

The UNCTAD Restrictive
Business Practices Code:

A Step in the
North-South Dialogue
On April 22, 1980 in Geneva, the United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices concluded its negotiations by reaching agreement on a
"Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control
of Restrictive Business Practices" (Principles and Rules).' The agreement
was reached after two sessions of a diplomatic conference held under the
auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), from November 19 through December 8, 1979 and from April 8
through April 22, 1980. The conference transmitted the text of the Principles
and Rules to the United Nations General Assembly for adoption as a resolution in its next session in the fall of 1980.
The conference's approval of the Principles and Rules came at the end of
more than thirty years of discussions and negotiation of an international code
for competition. At the end of World War II, the United States had proposed
the creation of an international trade organization, the draft charter of which
contained provisions condemning certain restrictive business practices. The
Havana Charter2 was never adopted by the United States Congress, largely

*Messrs. Atkeson and Gill practice law in Washington, D.C. and New York, respectively.
'U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10(1980). For two views on the draft UNCTAD RBP Code
prior to the final negotiations, see Davidow, The-UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code,
13 INT'L LAW. 587 (1979) and Gill, The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices Code: A Code
for Competition? 13 INT'L LAW. 607 (1979). Stuart Benson of the State Department Office of the
Legal Advisor headed the United States delegation in the diplomatic level negotiations of the
UNCTAD RBP Code; Davidow of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division was ViceChairman. Gill attended the April 1980 final negotiating session as an advisor to the United
States delegation. Mr. Davidow's article contains much useful background and explanation of
the code to which the reader is referred.
2
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT, HAVANA, 1947-1948: FINAL ACT
AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, MARCH 1948.
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because of controversies unrelated to restrictive business practices. During
the years after Havana, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and
then UNCTAD took up the question of regulating restrictive business practices. In 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at a special session of the
United Nations indicated that the United States was willing to discuss the
subject of codes of conduct for multinational corporations in various
spheres, including restrictive business practices. After this, the UNCTAD
discussions of the subject began to accelerate. In 1978, UNCTAD issued the
Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices on its fifth session held in Geneva July 10-21, 1978.1 The UNCTAD
Secretariat also prepared a first draft of a Model Law for consideration by
the Ad Hoc Group of Experts.' The Ad Hoc Group of Experts held its sixth
session April 17-27, 1979 and completed its work on the set of Principles and
Rules. Although the "Principles and Rules" were described as "multilaterally agreed," there in fact remained wide areas of disagreement between the
Group of 77 (the less developed countries), Group B (the developed countries) and Group D (the East Bloc).'
The Group of Experts passed the task to a diplomatic negotiating conference held at the end of 1979. Agreement was finally reached on the principle, urged by the developed countries, that the code should not be in treaty
form but should be embodied in a United Nations General Assembly resolution. It also was agreed that implementation of the code would not include
judgment on the behavior of any particular enterprise or government or on
the issues involved in any dispute. The issue of how to deal with parent/
subsidiary relationships remained a central problem. Joel Davidow, a prominent figure in the negotiations and vice-chairman of the United States delegation to the conference, has reported as follows:
Late in the negotiation, the Chairman of the Conference produced a text stating
that the section dealing with horizontal offenses would apply only to arrangements
between enterprises "not under common control," but that the section dealing with
abuses of a dominant position would apply to parent-subsidiary conduct, subject to
a footnote indicating that the listed restrictive practices might be nonabusive if
"appropriate in light of the legal organizational or managerial relationship of the
enterprises involved." '
The president's proposed compromise text suggested a complete exemption
from the code's provisions only for intergovernmental agreements with pro-

'Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices on its Fifth

Session, U.N.Doc.TD/B/C.2/AC.6/18(1978).
'First Draft of a Model Law or Laws on Restrictive Business Practices to Assist Developing
Countries in Devising Appropriate Legislation, U.N.Doc.TD/B/C.2/AC.6/16(1978) & 1979

update, U.N.Doc.TD/B/C.2/AC.6/16 Rev. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Model Law]. See
Davidow, supra note I at n. 10 for the reports of the three previous Ad Hoc Committees.
'Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices on its Sixth
Session, U.N.Doc.TD/250, TD/B/C.2/201, TD/B/C.2/AC.6/20(1979). [hereinafter cited as
UN 1979]
'Davidow, supra note I at 605.
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vision that "due account," i.e., application of the principle of comity, be
taken both of the extent to which conduct had been exempted or permitted by
national law and of the special trade, development and financial needs of
developing countries. The first session of the conference broke apart on the
refusal of the East Bloc countries to accept the principle that the code's provisions should apply fully to state enterprises.
The first session of the conference came so close to agreement that it became evident to business and legal circles in the United States and in Europe
that agreement on the code had suddenly moved from a distant possibility to
an imminent probability. Business groups had earlier expressed their deepseated reservations on the fundamental thrust of the proposed code. They
had raised questions as to whether the code was really a "code for competition" or, to put it more bluntly, "a tactical step in the South's struggle for the
New International Economic Order (and) . . .an effort by some representatives of the socialist world to impose its anticompetition, antiprivate business
principles in the trappings of principles to regulate 'restrictive business practices.'"' Nonetheless, many business groups at the end of the first session
were prepared to assist in obtaining appropriate provisions on the fundamental points which still divided the developed and developing countries.
The crucial issues concerning business were the following (abstracted from
the statement forwarded to the first session of the conference by the International Chamber of Commerce on November 16, 1979):
(1) The code should contain an express statement that its provisions are voluntary
and non-mandatory.
(2) Section E 3 should be amended to require "nondiscriminatory" treatment of
enterprises.
(3) With respect to transactions and relationships between affiliated enterprises, a
general exemption of affiliated relationships and behavior, such as that contained in Group B's proposed Section B (vii), must be added.
(4) The definition of "dominant position of market power" should be amended to
exclude any possible extension of "shared monopoly" situations.
(5) State enterprises must remain within the coverage of the Code.'
The second session of the conference began with an intense and sustained
effort by the Group of 77 to obtain the agreement of the Group D countries to
the inclusion of state enterprises within the definition of "enterprises" (in
section B3) and hence within the coverage of the code. This effort was finally
successful late in the evening of April 17. The Group of 77 then turned its
attention to sections D3 and D4 and attempted to narrow the proposal made
by Group B to exempt behavior and relationships of affiliated enterprises
from these sections. A compromise was reached on this issue on April 18. On
April 19 the groups debated the question whether an express statement that

'Gill, supra note 1 at 614.

'I.C.C. Doc.No.225/231 (Rev.).
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the code was "voluntary" should be included within the code itself. The
Group B request for such a statement was not obtained; instead Group B
accepted language indicating the voluntary nature of the code (confirmed in
open session by the representatives of the Group of 77 and in other respects as
discussed below).
Final agreement on the text of the Principles and Rules was reached early in
the morning of April 22, 1980. The final text was hailed by representatives of
the various groups. In contrast with the text of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises relating to competition,9 the Principles and Rules
deal in considerable detail with both the substantive definition of "restrictive
business practices" and the procedures for implementation of the code. At
the same time, the Principles and Rules have recourse in many instances to
generally expressed and largely undefined terms and definitions to achieve
the universal application of the code. Set forth below is a summary statement
of the principal provisions of the code and a brief discussion of their background and possible interpretation.
Section-by-Section Summary of
Code with Comments
The UNCTAD Restrictive Business Practices (RPB) Code, as finally negotiated, is organized in eight sections:
Preamble
Section A - Objectives
Section B - Definitions and scope of application
Section C - Multilaterally agreed-upon equitable principles for the control of restrictive business practices
Section D - Principles and rules for enterprises, including transnational
corporations
Section E - Principles and rules for states at national, regional and subregional levels
Section F - International measures
Section G - International institutional machinery
Preamble
The Preamble records the agreement of the United Nations Conference on
Restrictive Business Practices on the final text of the code. By stating that
"all countries should encourage their enterprises to follow" the code and by
referring to the code as "recommendations," the Preamble may be said to
characterize the code as voluntary and nonbinding. Such a characterization is
further reinforced by the Conference's recommendation that the code be

'OECD

DECLARATION AND DECISIONS ON GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND

MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (rev.

ed. 1979).
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adopted as a General Assembly Resolution, because the United Nations
Charter expressly defines such Resolutions as non-binding. During the
course of the Conference, the spokesman for the Group of 77 stated that the
Conference was negotiating a non-binding code, and at the final plenary
meeting of the Conference the Group B spokesman asserted that the Principles and Rules were "without having a legally binding character."1 Reflecting this background, the Department of State press release of April 29, 1980
refers to the code as "voluntary."
The Preamble contains tendentious references to "the possible adverse
impact of restrictive business practices, including among others those resulting from the increased activities of transnational corporations," to the "need
to eliminate the disadvantages to trade and development which may result
from the restrictive business practices of transnational corporations or other
enterprises," and to "attaining the objective in the establishment of a New
International Economic Order." The code clearly represents a compromise
between Group B views on the utility of competition and of transnational
corporation and Group of 77 views which give primacy to their own development and to the concepts of a New International Economic Order. The differences of view are in most cases blurred in the final version of the code, and
the Third World rhetoric is frequently offset by other language more reflective of Group B attitudes. It is not surprising, given the UNCTAD auspices of
the Conference, that the activities of transnational corporations should be
singled out in the Principles and Rules. The premises of the Preamble can
nevertheless be also fairly read as recognizing the important contribution
which competition and free trade can make to international development,
and of the role which transnational corporations currently play in such
process. During the course of the negotiations, the President's proposal endorsing "restructuring of international economic relations" was eliminated.
In the closing sessions of the Conference, the final premise of the Preamble
was expanded to include the concept of treatment "on the same basis to all

"Statement of Mr. William Morrow (Canada), April 22, 1980, TD/RBP/CONF/I 1(1980) at
9.; see also Letter from Undersecretary of State Richard N. Cooper to Mr. Richard W. Roberts,
President, National Foreign Trade Council (Aug. 20, 1980), "(the Code's) non-legally binding
nature has been assured in a number of ways."
Notwithstanding the above, one of the authors has elsewhere commented,
Even if the provisions of the code are expressly recognized as voluntary and nonbinding, the
problem remains that commentators and national authorities will persist in ascribing greater
significance to them and seek to have them mandated as national law and recognized as a
source of international law.
Gill, supra note I at 615-16. The footnote to the just-quoted material observes that "lt]he
Committee of the Association of the Bar Report ... for similar reasons warns that little reliance
should be placed on express reservations as to the nonbinding status of the code. Cf. Davidow
and Chiles, The UnitedStates and the Issue of the Binding or Voluntary Nature of International
Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1978);
Schwartz, Are the OECD and UNCTAD Codes Legally Binding?, I I INT'L LAW. 529 (1977).
(See Gill, supra note 1 at n.29.).
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enterprises" as well as "in accordance with established procedures of law."
The word "fairly" was added before the word "equitably." All of these
changes reflect the insistence of Group B that the Principles and Rules should
be applied in a non-discriminatory and "fair" manner.
Section A -

Objectives

Section A sets out five objectives of the code: (1) ensuring that restrictive
business practices do not interfere with trade liberalization, (2) promoting
efficiency through creation and encouragement of competition, (3) protection of consumer interests, (4) eliminating disadvantages to trade and development which may result from restrictive business practices by transnational
corporations and other enterprises, and (5) providing internationally recommended rules to facilitate "the strengthening of laws and policies in this area
at the national and regional levels."
Comment: The second objective recognizes that "the creation, encouragement and protection of competition" may contribute to the attaining of
"greater efficiency in international trade and development."
Section B
(i)

-

Definitions and Scope of Application

DEFINITIONS

1. "Restrictive business practices" means acts or behaviour of enterprises which,
through an abuse or acquisition and abuse of a dominant position of market
power, limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition, having
or being likely to have adverse effects on international trade, particularly that of
developing countries, and on the economic development of these countries, or
which through formal, informal, written or unwritten agreements or arrangements among enterprises have the same impact.
Comment: Two types of "restrictive business practices" are defined: (1)
"abuse. . . of a dominant position of market power," and (2) "agreements
or arrangements among enterprises (which) have the same impact." The definition of an "abuse" contains a threefold requirement: (i) that the practice
involve "an abuse or acquisition and abuse of a dominant position of market
power"; (ii) that the practice "limit access to markets or otherwise unduly
restrain competition"; and (iii) that the practice "hav(e) or being likely to
have adverse effects on international trade, particularly of developing countries, and on the economic development of those countries." Adverse effect
on the economies of developing countries by itself is not a sufficient test;
there must also be an undue restraint of competition and abuse of a "dominant position of market power." Section BI had been widely criticized for its

'"'Fair" was the Group B synonym for due process, respect for existing property and contractual rights, and legal rights and obligations; The Group of 77's favorite modifier was "equitable," with its aura of egalitarianism.
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inclusion of the "adverse effects" test on two grounds: (a) that such a test
blurred the competitive objective of the Code; and (b) that the test broadened
the coverage of the section. Discussion of the code at the Conference suggests
that while the first concern remains, the effect of the additional test is to limit
rather than to broaden coverage.
The question has been asked whether the second type of restrictive business
practice ("agreements or arrangements among enterprises [which] have the
same impact") requires an "abuse" of a dominant position. The answer
must be in the negative, although the substitution of the word "impact" for
"effect" may permit an economic argument along those lines. The second
type is aimed at horizontal offenses as proscribed in section D3 for enterprises "engaged in the market in rival or potentially rival activities." One
criticism that has been made of the definition of the second type of practice,
in both sections BI and D3, is that it is "open-ended," that D3 (unlike D4)
contains the phrase "such as the following," which may mean that the practices listed in D3 are not exclusively those prohibited by the section. On reflection, although the quoted phrase supports the argument, the argument probably goes too far. Both the second type of practice and D3 mirror section 1 of
the Sherman Act' 2 and section 85 of the EEC Treaty,'" and the practices listed
in D3 broadly describe the types of practices prohibited by those sections.
The suggestion that this code, an elementary primer of antitrust provisions,
reaches additional, undiscussed practices seems prima facie unreasonable.
Note that although the key prohibitions for enterprises in sections D3 and
D4 are directed at specific listed practices, the D3 and D4 prohibitions each
contain the conditions of B 1that the practices proscribed both (1) limit access
to markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition and (2) have adverse
effects on international trade and the economic development of developing
countries. D4 contains the third requirement that an "abuse" of a dominant
position of market power be involved. In effect, D4 repeats, by its terms, all
of the elements required for an "abusive" restrictive business practice under
section BI. Similarly, D3 contains within its terms all of the elements of the
second type of restrictive business practice defined in BI: those "which
through formal or informal, written or unwritten agreements or arrangements among enterprises have the same impact."
The concept of "undue restraint of competition" in the definition of both
types of restrictive business practice is likely to be shaped by precedents relating to similar terms in section 85 of the EEC's Treaty of Rome and in the
Sherman Act. It incorporates a "rule of reason" into the code.

215 U.S.C. § I etseq.
"Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, signed at Rome, March 25, 1957,
51 AM. J. INT'L L. 865 (1957).
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2. "Dominant position of market power" refers to a situation where an enterprise,
either by itself or acting together with a few other enterprises, is in a position to
control the relevant market for a particular good or service or group of goods or
services.

Comment: The requirement of joint action has been inserted to make it
clear that, where several enterprises are concerned, abuse of a dominant
position of market power involves some activity or conspiracy rather than the
mere structural potential of monopoly power. The addition of the word" acting" was intended to reject any implication that the code embraced the novel
and undeveloped concept of "shared monopoly." Davidow notes that abuse
of a dominant position of market power is made part of the definition of the
offense in section D4 and that "the effect of the provision is actually rather
conservative. . .

."

The added requirement that a multifirm dominant posi-

tion of market power involve action or conspiracy would, Davidow suggests,
make the provision "more conservative than the law in any major country .' '
It seems reasonable to expect that the "abuse of a dominant position of
market power" test will be guided by precedents relating to the similar language of section 86 of the EEC's Treaty of Rome.
3. "Enterprises" means firms, partnerships, corporations, companies, other associations, natural or juridical persons, or any combination thereof, irrespective
of the mode of creation or control or ownership, private or State, which are
engaged in commercial activities, and includes their branches, subsidiaries, affiliates, or other entities directly or indirectly controlled by them.
Comment: The definition of "enterprises," which describes the entities
whose activities are regulated in section D, includes any juridical person "irrespective of the mode of creation or control or ownership, private or state,
which are engaged in commercial activities. . .

."

By this language the code,

like the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, is applicable to
private, state-owned, and mixed ownership enterprises. In the final negotiating session in December 1979 the Group D socialist countries had made their
objections to the inclusion of state owned enterprises within the code a
ground for terminating the negotiations. Despite Group D's concurrence in
April 1980 in the final inclusion of state owned enterprises within the definition in section B3, it should be noted that: (1) Group D regards "transnational corporation" as excluding state owned enterprises; and (2) Group D
representatives have indicated that the voluntary nature of the code leaves
them free to consider state-owned enterprises as included only in "appropriate" circumstances.' 5 Additionally, the code does not apply to intergovern-

"Davidow, supra note I at 591-92.
"The statement by the spokesman for Group D at the closing meeting of the Conference
sought to blur the code's inclusions of state-owned enterprises by the repeated assertion that the
code was directed only at transnational corporations. See U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CNF/1 I (1980)
at 8.
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mental agreements nor to restrictive business practices directly caused by
intergovernmental agreements (section B9) and appears to exclude the conduct of enterprises "whether or not created or controlled by States" which
"is accepted under applicable legislation or regulations" (section C6). Nevertheless, the inclusion of state-owned enterprises "which are engaged in commercial activities" within the definition of "enterprises" in B3 represents an
important victory both for the West and for private business, in terms of
minimizing any discriminatory implications in the code and in countering
Group D's insistence that the code is directed solely against transnational
corporations.
The definition of "enterprises" ends with the inclusion of branches, subsidiaries and affiliates. The Group of 77 favored the view that local branches,
subsidiaries or affiliates are separate "enterprises" within the meaning of the
Principles and Rules so that any entity acting within their territory is made
responsible and subject to their laws and policies. Ultimately, the applicability of the code to interaffiliate transactions had to be clarified in section D3
and the footnote to D4. With respect to the obligation of enterprises to provide information, section D2 suggests that multiple country disclosure may
be recommended to the extent the interests of a particular country are directly
affected by restrictive business practices:
Enterprises should consult and cooperate with competent authorities of countries
directly affected in controlling restrictive business practices adversely affecting the
interests of those countries. In this regard, enterprises should also provide in formation, in particular details of restrictive arrangements, required for this purpose,
including that which may be located in foreign countries to the extent that in the
latter event such production or disclosure is not prevented by applicable law or
established public policy. (emphasis added)
(ii) SCOPE OF APPLICATION

4. The restrictive business practices aimed at are those "adversely affecting international trade, particularly that of developing countries and the
economic development of these countries." The code applies whether such
practices involve enterprises in one or more countries.
5. The code applies to all transactions in goods and services. It thus would
appear to apply to technology transfers and trademark transactions, except
perhaps for naked licenses. 6
6. The code is addressed to all enterprises. (See section B3 for the definition of enterprises and section E3 for the obligation of states to "ensure
treatment of enterprises which is fair, equitable, on the same basis to all
enterprises.")

'Obvious problems arise from the possibility of overlap between the code's provisions as
applied to the transfer of technology and the provisions of the draft UNCTAD code on transfer
of technology now being discussed. This overlap makes it essential that the provisions of the
latter code be made consistent with the present code.
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7. The code is "universally applicable to all countries and enterprises"
(but see sections B9, C6 and C7 on "exceptions").
8. The code applies to regional groupings of states to the extent they have
competence in the area of restrictive business practices (e.g., the European
Economic Community).
9. The code does not apply to intergovernmental agreements, nor to restrictive business practices caused by such agreements (e.g. OPEC?).
Section C - MultilaterallyAgreed- Upon Equitable Principlesfor
the Control of Restrictive Business Practices
(i)

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. Appropriate action sL.,uld be taken at national, regional and international levels to deal with restrictive business practices.
2. Governments should collaborate at bilateral and multilateral levels on
the control of restrictive business practices.
3. Appropriate mechanisms should be created or improved to facilitate
intergovernmental exchange of information on restrictive business practices.
4. Means should be devised to facilitate multilateral consultation with respect to policy issues involved in the control of restrictive business practices.
5. The code does not justify conduct otherwise unlawful under applicable
national or regional legislation.
(ii)

RELEVANT FACTORS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE SET OF
PRINCIPLES AND RULES

In order to ensure the fair and equitable application of the Set of Principles and
Rules, States, while bearing in mind the need to ensure the comprehensive application of the Set of Principles and Rules, should take due account of the extent to
which the conduct of enterprises, whether or not created or controlled by States, is
accepted under applicable legislation or regulations, bearing in mind that such laws
and regulations should be clearly defined and publicly and readily available, or is
required by States.
Comment: The code contemplates exceptions where the conduct of enterprises is (a) "accepted under applicable legislation or regulations" or (b)
"required by States." As a result the code arguably goes beyond the United
State antitrust defense of sovereign compulsion by suggesting special consideration for any conduct "accepted" under applicable law or regulations,
"bearing in mind that such laws and regulations should be clearly defined
and publicly and readily available. . . ."" Section C6 was the subject of

"See Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texas Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Gill, Two
Cheers for Timberlane, 10 Swiss REV. OF INT'L ANTITRUST L. 3 (1980), which discusses the
doctrines of foreign sovereign compulsion and act of state in their antitrust contexts. Reference
to "applicable" legislation or regulations raises the conflict of laws question analyzed in Timberlane.
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considerable discussion during the Conference. The Group D delegates made
their acceptance of the inclusion of state enterprises in B3 conditional upon
the express inclusion of such enterprises within the exception provision of C6.
The text continues the phrasing, inaugurated in the President's December
1979 draft, of stating the "exception" as a matter of comity ("due account")
rather than of exclusion. Several Group B delegations expressed concern at
the narrowing of the principle, also implied by the requirement "that such
laws and regulations should be clearly defined and publicly and readily
available." Australia for this reason stated that it might have to qualify its
acceptance of the Principles and Rules by a reservation as to this provision.

(iii)

PREFERENTIAL OR DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

7. In order to ensure the equitable application of the Set of Principles and Rules,
States, particularly of developed countries, should take into account in their
control of restrictive business practices the development, financial and trade
needs of developing countries, in particular the least developed countries, for the
epurposes especially of developing countries in:
(a) promoting the establishment or development of domestic industries and
the economic development of other sectors of the economy; and
(b) encouraging their economic development through regional or global arrangements among developing countries.
Comment: Group B accepted the Group of 77's demand for "preferential
or differential treatment for developing countries." The principle, however,
is expressed, consistent with C6, as a matter of comity which states "should
take into account." It may be argued that recognition of this principle of
"preferential or differential treatment" does violence to the concept of the
code as a code for competition. On the other hand, most observers have now
concluded that the Group of 77 is more interested in development than in
competition and that acknowledgement of this fact represents an acceptance
of reality rather than a retreat from principle.
Section D - Principlesand Rules for Enterprises
Including TransnationalCorporations
1. Enterprises should conform to the restrictive business practice laws of
the countries in which they operate; in the event of proceedings under these
laws they "should be subject to the competence of the courts and relevant
administrative bodies therein."
Comment: Several business organizations, including the International
Chamber of Commerce, suggested that the final clause in the preceding sentence should be eliminated because such words were superfluous at best and
may adversely encourage countries to exercise extraterritoriality jurisdiction
over foreign enterprises doing business in their territories. Representatives of
various Group B countries publicly rejected such suggestions on the ground
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that the Principles and Rules are completely "neutral" on jurisdiction."S The
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises specifically note that such
exercise of jurisdiction by any state is "subject to international law" (paragraph 7); although the latter phrase is omitted in this code, it must be assumed
that it remains as an implied condition.
2. Enterprises should cooperate with "competent authorities of countries
directly affected in controlling restrictive business practices adversely affecting the interests of those countries." In this regard, they should provide
information, including information which may be located in foreign countries to the extent that such production is not prohibited by "applicable law
or established public policy."
3. Enterprises, except when dealing with each other in the context of an
economic entity wherein they are under common control, including through
ownership, or otherwise not able to act independently of each other, engaged
on the market in rival or potentially rival activities, should refrain from practices such as the following when, through formal, informal, written or unwritten agreements or arrangements, they limit access to markets or
otherwise unduly restrain competition, having or being likely to have adverse
effects on international trade, particularly that of developing countries,,and
on the economic development of these countries:
(a) agreements fixing prices including as to exports and imports;
(b) collusive tendering;
(c) market or customer allocation arrangements;
(d) allocation by quota as to sales and production;
(e) collective action to enforce arrangements-e.g., by concerted refusals
to deal;
(f) concerted refusal of supplies to potential importers;
(g) collective denial of access to an arrangement, or association, which is
crucial to competition.
Comment: Sections D3 and D4 contain the most detailed prohibitions in
the code. Under section D3, enterprises (excluding enterprises "under common control") which are "engaged on the market in rival or potentially rival
activities" may not through cartel-like agreements or arrangements (a) fix
prices of exports or imports, (b) engage in collusive tendering, (c) allocate
markets or customers, (d) allocate sales and production quotas, (e) engage
in concerted refusals to deal, (f) engage in concerted refusals of supplies to
potential importers or (g) collectively deny access to an arrangement or association crucial to competition, where the effect is to "limit access to markets
or otherwise unduly restrain competition" and "having or being likely to
have adverse effects on international trade, particularly that of developing
countries, and on the economic development of those countries."
'For example, spokesmen for both the United States and West Germany asserted the "neutrality" of the Principles and Rules at a Group B Contact Group meeting; a similar statement
was made at a May 30, 1980 meeting of the Department of State Multinational Enterprises
Advisory Committee Meeting.
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The application of sections D3 and D4 to affiliated enterprises presented
one of the most difficult problems faced by the Conference. The President's
text, offered at the end of the first negotiating Conference, had proposed to
exempt those enterprises "under common control." A number of business
organizations feared that the words "common control" might be given too
narrow an interpretation and suggested the test for exclusion be whether the
enterprises were "component entities of the same group-enterprise." The
Group of 77 countered with a proposal that the "common control" test be
broadened by the addition of the phrase "or otherwise not able to act independently of each other."
The compromise finally reached was to exclude those enterprises "dealing
with each other in the context of an economic entity wherein they are under
common control, including through ownership, or otherwise not able to act
independently of each other." The final text, through the use of the general
phrase, "in the context of an economic entity," broadens the exclusion to
cover circumstances other than those which the simple test of "common
control" might indicate. A Group B spokesman has suggested that this might
extend to excluding enterprises related to each other by a management contract since such a contractual relationship could create "an economic entity"
excluded under the phrase. The addition of the phrase "including through
ownership," was added to indicate that more than stock ownership relations
were included, and to suggest that minority as well as majority stock ownerships could fall within the exclusion.
Finally, the phrase adopted from that proposed by the Group of 77, "or
otherwise not able to act independently of each other" is viewed by some as
encompassing a broad spectrum of economic relations between concerns,
both affiliated and non-affiliated. The consensus among the Group B delegates was that the use of broad and general exclusionary language was preferable to any narrowly defined exception which might be interpreted to include
normal affiliated relations and behavior. The reference to "rival or potentially rival activities" would also seem to support the contention that normal
affiliated behavior and relations are not intended to be covered by D3, a
concession publicly made by representatives of both Group B and the Group
of 77. 9
4. Enterprises should refrain from the following acts or behaviour in a
relevant market when, through an abuse2" or acquisition and abuse of a
dominant position of market power, they limit access to markets or otherwise
unduly restrain competition, having or being likely to have adverse effects on
'Statements made at plenary meetings of the conference on April 10, 1980.
Whether acts or behaviour are abusive or not should be examined in terms of their purpose
and effects in the actual situation, in particular with reference to whether they limit access to
markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition, having or being likely to have adverse effects
on international trade, particularly that of developing countries, and on the economic development of these countries, and to whether they are:
(a) appropriate in the light of the organizational, managerial and legal relationship among
the enterprises concerned, such as in the context of relations within an economic entity and not
2
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international trade, particularly that of developing countries, and on the
economic development of these countries:
(a) predatory behaviour towards competitors, such as using below cost
pricing to eliminate competitors;
(b) discriminatory (i.e. unjustifiably differentiated) pricing or terms or
conditions in the supply or purchase of goods or services, including by
means of the use of pricing policies in transactions between affiliated
enterprises which overcharge or undercharge for goods or services purchased or supplied as compared with prices for similar or comparable
transactions outside the affiliated enterprises;
(c) mergers, takeovers, joint ventures or other acquisitions of control,
whether of a horizontal, vertical or a conglomerate nature;
(d) fixing the prices at which goods exported can be resold in importing
countries;
(e) restrictions on the importation of goods which have been legitimately
marked abroad with a trademark identical or similar to the trademark
protected as to identical or similar goods in the importing country
where the trademarks in question are of the same origin, i.e., belong to
the same owner or are used by enterprises between which there is
economic, organizational, managerial or legal interdependence and
where the purpose of such restrictions is to maintain artificially high
prices;
(f) when not for ensuring the achievement of legitimate business purposes, such as quality, safety, adequate distribution or service:
(i) partial or complete refusals to deal on the enterprise's customary
commercial terms;
(ii) making the supply of particular goods or services dependent upon
the acceptance of restrictions on the distribution or manufacture
of competing or other goods;
(iii) imposing restrictions concerning where, or to whom, or in what
form or quantities goods supplied or other goods may be re-sold
or exported;
(iv) making the supply of particular goods or services dependent upon
the purchase of other goods or services from the supplier or his
designee.
Comment: Section D4 contains a detailed list of prohibited practices involving an abuse of a dominant position of market power. As with D3, the
prohibitions only apply where the effect is to limit access to markets or unduly restrain competition andto have an adverse effect on international trade
having restrictive effects outside the related enterprises.
(b) appropriate in light of special conditions or economic circumstances in the relevant
market such as exceptional conditions of supply and demand or the size of the market;
(c) of types which are usually treated as acceptable under pertinent national or regional
laws and regulations for the control of restrictive business practices;
(d) consistent with the purposes and objectives of these principles and rules.
U.N.Doc.TD/RBP/CONF/10 (1980) Annex at 5.
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and on the economic development of developing countries.
The exclusion of acts involving affiliates under D4 is more qualified than in
D3. A footnote provides that "whether acts or behaviour are abusive or not
should be examined in terms of their purpose and effects in the actual situation," including whether they are "appropriate in the light of the organizational, managerial and legal relationship among the enterprises concerned,
such as in the context of relations within an economic entity and not having
restrictive effects outside the related enterprises." 2 ' The president's draft had
proposed that the footnote exclusion call for examination as to whether the
acts or behaviour were "appropriate in the light of organizational, managerial
and legal relations between the enterprises concerned." Group B proposed
that this exclusion be broadened to incorporate the same concept used in D3,
i.e., "in the context of relations within an economic entity" and that actions
"not having restrictive effects outside the related enterprises" be excluded in
any event. This latter addition would make the test for affiliated enterprises
under section D4 the equivalent of their treatment under United States antitrust practice.22 Both Group B proposals were adopted.
The practices listed in D4 are: (a) predatory behaviour toward competitors, such as using below cost pricing to eliminate competitors;
(b) discriminatory ("unjustifiably differentiated") pricing; (c) mergers,
takeovers, joint ventures or other acquisitions of control; (d) fixing the
prices at which goods can be resold in importing countries; (e) certain restrictions on the importation of trademarked goods where the importing country
produces goods bearing the same or a similar trademark; and (f) the following listed restraints on competition when not justified by legitimate business
purposes such as quality, safety, adequate distribution or service:
(i) refusals to deal on customary commercial terms; (ii) exclusive dealing;
(iii) customer or export restrictions; and (iv) tying arrangements.
Subparagraph (b), which deals with "discriminatory" pricing and terms,
was a subject of much discussion. The question of inclusion of affiliated
transactions was resolved by addition of the following clause: "including by
means of the use of pricing policies in transactions between affiliated enterprises which overcharge or undercharge for goods or services purchased or
supplied as compared with prices for similar or comparable transactions outside the affiliated enterprises." Although some commentators have expressed fear that this clause requires "arms-length pricing" between affiliated enterprises, such an interpretation would be strained. 23 The clause is
qualified by both the footnote reference, which requires "restrictive effects
outside the related enterprise," and is subject to the rule of reason test that
2

Id. at 5.
"See discussion in DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
TIONS (rev. ed. 1977). Case A, pp. 10, 12.

"1Cf OECD

ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERA-

GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES,

supra note 9 at 19, where the

guideline for competition urges that enterprises refrain from "abusing a dominant position of
market power" by means of "discriminatory, i.e. unreasonably differentiated, pricing and using
such pricing transactions between affiliated enterprises as a means of affecting adversely competition outside these enterprises."
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the action must "unduly restrain competition" as well as meet the other tests
of the paragraph. D4(ii)'s earlier reference, in the President's draft, to "excessive pricing" was stricken in the final text.
Subparagraph (e) contains an express reference to trademarks. An earlier
Group B proposal to except from the coverage of D3 and D4 "any rights,
defenses or justifications flowing from the special rights and duties associated with the trademark" fell by the wayside in the final days of the Conference, a victim of insufficient time rather than of disagreement. Since local
laws customarily provide for special treatment of trademarked goods, it
seems doubtful that these laws will be in any way affected by the specific
provision or by the failure to obtain the Group B proposal.
Business and legal groups criticized the inclusion, in D4's litany of proscribed practices, of "discriminatory pricing" and "mergers." Their fear
was that these practices, which frequently reflect or enhance rather than
restrain competition, might be subjected to improper attacks for reasons
unrelated to competition in nonmarket economies. The concern is a legitimate one, but the answer must be that the inclusion of such practices in D4
requires that they be viewed as objectionable only when they unduly restrain
competition, constitute an "abuse" and otherwise meet the tests of the Section.
Section E

-

Principles and Rules for States at
National, Regional and Subregional Levels

1. States are to adopt, improve and enforce legislation for the control of
restrictive business practices.
2. States should aim their legislation primarily at restrictive business practices as that term is defined in the code.
3. Section E3 endorses the principle of national treatment in the control of
restrictive business practices: "States in their control of restrictive business
practices should ensure treatment of enterprises which is fair, equitable, on
the same basis to all enterprises, and in accordance with established procedures of law."
Comment: Group B unsuccessfully urged that the word "nondiscriminatory" be included in this section. Instead, the Group of 77 accepted the compromise formulation of "on the same basis to all enterprises" in both this
section and in the Preamble. This latter phrase would seem to ensure at least a
"most favored nation" standard and probably the equivalence of "national
treatment." The question has been asked whether the phrase "on the same
basis to all enterprises" connotes an international law standard of justice.
Since the phrase is coupled with "in accordance with the established procedures of law" and the word "fair" as well as "equitable," such a question
can probably be answered in the affirmative. In any event, section E3, together with the confidentiality provisions for "legitimate business secrets" in
E5, offers an opportunity to international business enterprises to secure important procedural "due process" protections and may set a valuable prece-
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dent for the language of the Proposed United Nations Code for Transnational Corporations.
4. States are committed to seek appropriate measures to prevent use of
restrictive practices within their competence when it comes to their attention
that such practices adversely affect international trade and development.
5. States obtaining information from enterprises which contains legitimate business secrets are obligated to accord such information reasonable
safeguards normally applicable in this field.
6. States should improve their procedures for obtaining information on
restrictive business practices.
7. States should establish mechanisms at regional levels to promote exchange of information on restrictive business practices and to assist in their
control.
8. States with more experience in the control of restrictive business practices should, on request, share this experience with other States.
9. States should, on request, or at their own initiative, supply publicly
available information, and possibly other information, necessary to a receiving, interested State for its control of restrictive business practices.
Comment: Former section E6 from the President's draft, requesting states
to prevent their laws "fostering the participation of enterprises in international agreements" of a cartel-like nature, was eliminated in the last few days
of the Conference. The United States had supported the proposal but insisted
on the word "international," in deference to the Webb-Pomerene Act;2" a
number of European delegations strongly attacked the provision as discriminatory against their EEC groupings. The issue lost much of its importance with the adoption of section C6.
Section F-InternationalMeasures
1. International collaboration is proposed to achieve common approaches, compatible with the code, in national policies relating to restrictive
business practices.
2. States and regional groupings should communicate annually to
UNCTAD steps taken "to meet their commitment" to the code.
3. UNCTAD should continue its publication of an annual report on restrictive business practice legislation and developments.
4. (a) States may undertake consultations with other States to resolve restrictive business practice issues. If both states involved request it, the Secretary General of UNCTAD will provide "mutually agreed conference facilities for such a consultation."
(b) States should be responsive to requests for consultations.
(c) If the states involved agree, a joint report on a consultation should

215 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1976), 40 Stat. 516 (1918).
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be prepared, with the assistance of UNCTAD if desired.
Comment: Group B was successful in scaling back the UNCTAD provision
of"facilities for such a consultation" to only "conference" facilities. Group
B was also able to delete the following conciliation provision, originally section G 4(d) in the President's draft:
(d) furthermore, if the States concerned so agree, the Secretary-General of
UNCTAD shall bring any unresolved matter to the attention of the Trade and
Development Board in order to consider what further action might be taken to
resolve the issue in question.
5. UNCTAD should continue its work on the elaboration of a model law
on restrictive business practices. 25
6. UNCTAD should continue its technical assistance, advisory and training program on restrictive business practices.
7. The United Nations Development Program should assist in financing
the UNCTAD restrictive business practices program referred to. Countries
are invited to make voluntary contributions.
Section G-InternationalInstitutionalMachinery
(i) INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
1. An Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices operating within the framework of an UNCTAD Committee will provide "the institutional machinery."
2. States which have "accepted" the code should take appropriate steps to
meet their commitment.
(ii)

FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL GROUP

3. (a) To be a forum for discussion of matters related to the code.
(b) To undertake and disseminate research related to provisions of the
code.
(c) To consider relevant U.N. studies and reports.
(d) To study matters related to the code covered by information obtained from requests addressed to all states.
(e) To collect and disseminate information on implementation of the
code.
(f) To make appropriate reports and recommendations to states on
matters within its competence.
(g) To submit annual reports on its work.
4. "In the performance of its functions, neither the Intergovernmental
Group of Experts nor its subsidiary organs shall act like a tribunal or
otherwise pass judgement on the activities or conduct of individual Govern-

"See discussion of text of the Model Law.
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ments or of individual enterprises in connection with a specific business
transaction. The Intergovernmental Group or its subsidiary organs should
avoid becoming involved when enterprises to a specific business transaction
are in dispute."
Comment: Section G4 is another crucial provision of the code. Its inclusion further bolsters the conclusion that the code is purely a voluntary set of
Principles and Rules.
5. The Intergovernmental Group shall establish necessary procedures to
deal with issues related to confidentiality.
(iii) REVIEW PROCEDURE
6. Subject to the approval of the General Assembly, five years after adoption of the code by the General Assembly, a U.N. Conference shall be convened for reviewing "all the aspects" of the code. The Intergovernmental
Group shall make proposals to this Conference for the "improvement and
further development" of the code.
Comment: In the related discussions of the proposed UNCTAD code regulating the transfer of technology, the Group of 77 have reluctantly accepted a
similar silence on the "voluntary" nature of the code and on the provisions
for a review conference four to six years after adoption of the technology
code. With respect to the transfer of technology code, however, the Group of
77, who have exhibited a greater interest in achieving its enactment than with
respect to the restrictive business practices code, have publicly warned that
they will seek to have the code declared binding and made mandatory at the
review conference. No such statement has been made by the Group of 77 or
any other group with respect to the review conference planned for the restrictive business practices code, and it seems doubtful that this will be a major
issue in the future.
Next Steps
The restrictive business practices code was adopted by consensus by the
United Nations General Assembly as Resolution No. 35/63 on December 5,
1980. Business reaction to the code, while mixed, has included expressions of
appreciation for the conference's adoption of many of their recommendations for change or clarification of the code, while at the same time voicing
concern with respect to future implementation of the code by both UNCTAD
and the member countries of UNCTAD. The United States Council of the
International Chamber of Commerce adopted the following statement,
which it forwarded to the United States government:
While the Committee would have preferred that the text of the Set of Principles and
Rules contain an express characterization of the code as "voluntary," we note that,
for the most part, the suggestions of the ICC and other business groups have been
recognized by the negotiators with respect to other provisions of the code, particularly those dealing with affiliated enterprises. We believe that the OECD and BIAC
should jointly or separately take action to express their understanding of the volun-
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tary nature of the Set of Principles and Rules. BIAC should urge their governments
on the vote in the General Assembly to state affirmatively that the Resolution is
recommendatory and does not bind any government to take any action in implementation of it. Most importantly, we believe that it is essential that both governments and business groups should continue to monitor the progress of the proposed
resolution through the General Assembly and the utilization and implementation of
the code by UNCTAD and its member countries, including any proposal for a
Model Law. In our opinion, the detail of the Set of Principles and Rules makes it
unnecessary to draft a Model Law. 26

The National Foreign Trade Council commented:
The impact of the Code will depend largely on how it is interpreted and implemented, especially by developing countries. If its provisions are utilized as guidelines for the formulation of policies to promote genuine competition in international business, both developed and developing countries may benefit. If on the
other hand developing nations utilize the Code as a weapon to intervene in and
restrict normal and legitimate activities of U.S. multinational corporations, it could
reduce trade with and investment in developing countries, thus impeding the very
growth of their world economies which the Code purports to serve. Both the United
States Government and the international business community should carefully
monitor the use and implementation of the Code and take vigorous action to assure
that it will have a beneficial rather than adverse effect on a free and open international trading system.
The Restrictive Business Practices Code will be open to interpretation by nations
having different and in some cases irreconcilable economic systems. The long-term
impact of the Code on the conduct of international business is therefore now difficult to assess. We recommend that the State Department give serious consideration
to deferring action on any other such codes until the effects of the Restrictive
Business Practices Code have been assessed through experience.
We do not think it appropriate that companies be asked to subscribe to the Code;
but they should be made aware of the Code and its implications and urged to adhere
to the spirit of fair competition in international trade which the Code was intended
to promote, despite the problems which the Council perceives in interpretation of
the Code. 27

The United States Chamber of Commerce, after commending the United
States negotiators for their diligent efforts, suggested that there were several
points which it believed should be made in the United Nations resolution
adopting the code. These include reference to the voluntary and nonbinding
nature of the code, a more positive characterization of the contribution of
transnational corporations to the development process, and clarification that
the purpose of the code is to promote the adoption of antitrust laws rather
than the correction of some problem peculiar to transnational corporations."
The National Association of Manufacturers, after noting that certain im-

' 6Statement by the United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce (May
28, 1980).
"Statement by the National Foreign Trade Council (July 21, 1980).
"'Letter from John L. Caldwell, Vice-President, International, to Undersecretary of State
Richard N. Cooper (July 10, 1980).
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provements in the proposed code had been obtained in the course of negotiation, expressed its concern:
It is quite probable that many governments will simply use this Code to harass
American companies operating locally, and then disregard the Code when it is
convenient for them to do so. For this reason, NAM plans to monitor the implementation of the Code in the next few years, and we assume that the State Department will do likewise, to ensure to the greatest practicable extent that the Code is not
misapplied or misinterpreted by foreign governments to the detriment of American
firms operating abroad.

It appears that the business groups are united in their belief that the United
States government should carefully monitor the future implementation of the
code, to avoid its misapplication by either UNCTAD or the member countries of UNCTAD. There was less than unanimous agreement as to whether
the United States government should have sought express statements in the
United Nations resolution as to the voluntary nature of the Principles and
Rules and their non-binding status. The Department of State and some business groups are fearful that attempts to create "legislative history" on the
floor of the General Assembly might trigger conflicting responses from
Group of 77 members, and were therefore inclined to make very brief comment if any. Under Article 10 of the United Nations Charter, General Assembly resolutions are only recommendations to states and non-binding.
Some observers feared that attempts to designate certain General Assembly
resolutions as "voluntary" might derogate from this principle and lead to
different categories of General Assembly resolutions with varying legal status.29

All business groups agree that any further work on a "model law" merits
continuing attention and discouragement. The current UNCTAD Secretariat-drafted model law (referred to as a "first draft") was circulated in 1978
and discussed at the sixth session of the Third Ad Hoc Experts Group prior to
diplomatic level negotiation of the code." ° As a result, the draft does not take
account of the changes made in the final negotiations, e.g., exceptions for
inter-affiliate transactions and rejection of the shared monopoly concept.
More significantly, the model law, in the extensive controls over economic
activities, e.g., controls over "excessive or unfair" prices, which it suggests
'ln the actual debate on the General Assembly resolution, Ambassador Spero (for the U.S.)
stated that ". . . the principles and rules represent recommendations for enterprises and state
conduct and are not of a legally binding character . . ." Representatives of Australia and
Canada also emphasized the voluntary nature of the code. Australia expressed its support for
"the vital role of consultations between States" and the "position that the principles of sovereignty and comity prevent one State from unilaterally seeking to extend extraterritorially the
enforcement of its laws to activities engaged in, sanctioned by or caused by another State. These
principles are clearly implicit in the resolution." The United Kingdom representative rejected
"the so-called effects doctrine in the application of national competition law to international
business activities" and "excessive assumptions of jurisdiction by other countries in relation to
persons and activities in the United Kingdom." Provisional Verbatim Record of the 84th Meeting (U.N. Doc. A/35/PV.84, December 8, 1980).
"Letter from Lawrence A. Fox, Vice-President, International, to Undersecretary of State
Richard N. Cooper (July 1, 1980).
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to developing countries, goes far beyond the provisions of the code and is
inconsistent with its objectives and scope. The spokesman for the Group of
Experts from Group B noted in April 1979 that
[tihe whole of the proposal suggested a degree of regulation of ordinary business
decisions which would be burdensome to all concerned and might be anticompetitive, rather than promoting competition, and could also seriously hamper trade and
investment. Of course, one had to prevent abuses of the freedom to do business, but
as a whole a careful balance had to be established between too much business
freedom and not enough."
The spokesman concluded that the many provisions of the Model Law would
be "very difficult to administer, possibly counter-productive or anticompetitive and beyond the scope of competition regulation." Given the extended
negotiations required to reach agreement on the provisions of the code itself,
it would be both unwise and dangerous for the UNCTAD Secretariat or any
other machinery established under this code to continue to negotiate with
respect to the concepts presently included within the Model Law. The code
itself should provide a sufficient guideline for any national legislation which
is adopted.
Conclusion
Adoption of the United Nations Code on restrictive business practices may
accelerate and increase the pressures to conclude negotiations on other pending codes (principally the proposed UNCTAD Code on Transfer of Technology and the United Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations). On the other hand, the fact that most of the major problems in this
code could ultimately be corrected through patient negotiation should encourage the Group B industrialized countries to continue to resist other code
formulations that do not meet the standards established in this code.
The long-term impact of the code on international business is hard to predict. Interpreted in the light of United States and European experience, the
code does not go beyond United States and Common Market precedents.
Interpreted by new bureaucracies in developing countries without established
private enterprise or competition traditions, however, the code could be used
to justify increased government intervention, regulation and discrimination
against transnational corporations. The most powerful criticism of the code
exercise has consistently been that its provisions for competition have never
been accepted or understood by the undeveloped or nonmarket economy
countries whose economic and political systems differ widely from those of
the West. In light of this uncertain prospect for the code's interpretation, the
American business community should not be asked by its government to
subscribe to the code or to be formally accountable for their conduct in light
of the code. They need to be aware of its provisions and to be assured that the
U.S. delegation to UNCTAD will monitor UNCTAD's implementation pro"UN 1979, supra note 5, at 49.
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gram so that it continues within the limitations contemplated.
If one is optimistic, one may draw two further conclusions from the history
of the development and negotiation of the United Nations Code on restrictive
business practices. First, from the viewpoint of both business and the international economic community, the participation of business and legal groups in
the development of the code contributed significantly to the drafting of provisions acceptable to business. One may conclude that continued business
and legal group participation in future negotiations is essential in improving
both the quality of the final product and the sense of realism in the ongoing
North-South dialogue. Second, the recently concluded negotiations suggest
that North-South negotiations may be conducted in part on the basis of rational discussions rather than solely as a matter of political maneuver or
power bloc tactics. As the spokesman for Group B said at the closing meeting
of the conference:
This Set of Principles and Rules will mark the beginning of a new era in the history
of economic relations between nations; it marks the conscious restatement of the
necessity of competition in international transactions as a guarantee of fairness and
equity for all parties. This Set of Principles and Rules will also be a significant step
in the evolution and development of mutually satisfactory economic relations in the
North-South dialogue.32

"Statement of Mr. William Morrow (Canada), April 22, 1980, TD/RB/CONF/ 11(1980) at 8.
Historical justice requires that Joel Davidow be granted the last word:
Transforming grievances about multinational enterprises from political rhetoric to specific
issues about which experts can analyze facts and negotiate rules can be a"significant step in
reducing North-South tensions.
Davidow, The Seeking of a World Competition Code: Quixotic Quest?, Speech, Airlie House
Conference on International Antitrust, Columbia University Center for Law and Economic
Studies, November 1979.

